Naxal, Naxalite and Naksalvadi are generic terms used to refer to
various militant Communist groups operating in different parts of India
under different organizational envelopes. In the eastern states of the mainland
India (Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, West Bengal and Odisha), they are
usually known as, or refer to themselves as Maoists while in southern states like Andhra
Pradesh they are
known under other titles. They have been declared as a terrorist organization under the Unlawful.Leaders of the
movement have been found to have hideouts located in China.
The
term 'Naxal' derives from the name of the village Naxalbari in West Bengal, where the movement had its
origin. The Naxals are considered far-left radical communists, supportive of Maoist political sentiment and ideology. Their origin
can be traced to the split in 1967 of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), leading to
the formation of the Communist Party of India
(Marxist–Leninist). Initially the movement had its centre in West Bengal. In later
years, it spread into less developed areas of rural southern and eastern India,
such as Chhattisgarh, Odisha and
Andhra Pradesh through the activities of underground groups like theCommunist Party of India (Maoist).For the
past 10 years, it has grown mostly from displaced tribal and natives who are
fighting against exploitation from major Indian corporations and local
officials whom they believe to be corrupt.
Supporters
Mao Zedong provided ideological leadership for the Naxalbari Movement
advocating that Indian peasants and lower class tribals overthrow the
government and upper classes by force. A large number of Urban elites were also
attracted to the ideology which spread through Charu Majumdar’s writings,
oarticularly the “ Historic Eight Documents’ which formed the basis of Naxalite
ideology.
And
again in 1967 Naxalites organized the All India Coordination Committee of
Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR). Later it gave birth to the Communist Party
of India (CPI) One thing that’s noticeable is that Central government
did nothing about the activities or movements.
Starting of violence
During
1970 Naxalites gained a strong presence among the radical sections of the
student movement in Calcutta. Students left school to join the Naxalities.
Charu Majumdar to entice more students into his organization declared that
revolutionary warfare was to take place not only in rural areas but every
where. Schools were shut down. Naxalities took over Jadaypur University and
used the machine shop facilities to make pipe guns to attack the police. Headquarter became Presidency College
Calcutta. They got good support from elite groups and Delhi’s prestigious St.
Stephen’s College, many contemporary Indian leaders and thinkers became a
hotbed of Naxalite activities.
The
chief minister, Siddhartha Shankar Ray of the Congress Party, instituted strong counter-measures against the Naxalites. The
West Bengal police fought back to stop the Naxalites. The house of Somen Mitra,
the Congress MLA of Sealdah, was allegedly turned into a torture chamber where
Naxal students from Presidency College and CU were incarcerated illegally by
police and the Congress cadres. CPI-M cadres were also involved in the
"state terror". After suffering losses and facing the public
rejection of Majumdar's "annihilation line", the Naxalites alleged
human rights violations by the West Bengal police, who responded that the state
was effectively fighting a civil war and that democratic pleasantries had no
place in a war, especially when the opponent did not fight within the norms of
democracy and civility.
Large
sections of the Naxal movement began to question Majumdar's leadership. In 1971
the CPI (ML) was split, as the Satyanarayan
Singh revolted
against Majumdar's leadership. In 1972 Majumdar was arrested by the police and
died in Alipore
Jail. His
death accelerated the fragmentation of the movement.
Naxalite movement as a failure
Ø
The Naxalites wanted to surround the towns and cities by the
villages, i.e., they wanted to encircle the urban centres with organized
peasant forces of the villages. If the peasant militia could have occupied the
cities, according to Majumdar, the so-called bourgeois government would fall
making the passage to the coming of a socialist government; but the Naxalites
could not and did not come up to a stage capable of organizing the peasants and
thereby encircling the towns.
Ø
Majumdar gave sole importance to secret organization, and
justified the policy of continuing the Movement without the need to build any
popular mass base, forgetting or ignoring the fact, popular mass base is the
basic criteria of any Communist-Leftist Revolutionary movement.
Ø
Kanu Sanyal the original founder of the Movement vehemently did
oppose this wrong action plan, while being interred in the 'Parvatipuram
Conspiracy Case'. Armed training for the purpose of eliminating 'Class Enemies'
was preached, but the educating the cadres on the Marxist-Leninist thought
process was never taken up, resulting in a lions majority of the cadres coming
out of an urban-frustrated-middle class background without any Revolutionary
teaching and zeal, and who were desperate for senseless actions. As the
Naxalites did not have mass level organization, they lacked mass support. With
only a few armed elements, and those not properly educated in the party line,
little could be accomplished.
Ø
"Khatam" (the action of eliminating the so-called
class enemies in villages) was a wrongheaded attempt at political mobilization
based on the individual murders of a select few people whose political class
and character was never adjudged by their socio-economic conditions or the
properties they possessed but very often only by their political affiliation or
by the name and colour of the party or parties they directly or indirectly
belonged to. For example, in Jalpaiguri and Alipurduar they killed some
petty jotdars who otherwise could have been comrades in action against
the capitalists or could be friends in a revolution for radical change. And
which blatantly shows the 'Myopic' lack of vision of the so called leadership
and the party workers.
Ø
Recruitment in the Naxalite party took place in the absence of
proper judgment and scrutiny of the political characters and behaviors of the
recruits. It was not uncommon for recruits into the Naxalite party to vent
their personal animosities by identifying their personal enemies as class
enemies, to be killed with the help of the Naxalite organization. Even murders
and Homicides were carried out by anti-social and hoodlum elements directly
under the patronage and protection of the ruling Congress(I) and the main
opposition the CPI(M) party, to discredit the Movement.
Ø
The ruling Congress party inserted spies inside the unguarded
Naxalite organization to gather information about its secret bases and arrest
its supporters. Government intelligence personnel and police disguised as
Naxalite sympathizers/supporters could easily infiltrate the party’s inner
organization and arrested many of its leaders, including Charu Majumdar. Thus
police had information about the movements of Majumdar after he had gone
underground in 1970, and he was arrested in Calcutta in July 1972. He died in
jail days after his arrest, probably in the night of 27 or 28 July. It is not
known how he died, although the government reported that he died of a heart attack. After the arrest and
detention of the original founders of the movement-Kanu Sanyal and Jangal
Santhal who were based amongst the peasant-farmers and the tribal labourers of
the tea gardens of rural North Bengal, the leadership passed into the hands of
people, majority of whom belonged to the urban-educated-opportunist-middle
class, the movement lost the character and feel of an
'agrarian-rural-peasant-laborer-Communist revolutionary' movement. Thus
Naxalbari Movement after losing its genuine character and nature, came to an
'incomplete' end.
So did
we accept the Naxalite movement as a legal authority? If we look at the
statistics of Naxal movements we can not deny the fact that even election
commission made it easy for them to do such activities when we see Naxalite
groups have become legal organizations participating in parliamentary elections
eg. Communist
Party Of India (
Marxist-Leninist) Liberation, the Communist Party of India (Narxist-Leninist) Janashakti.
Massacre by
Maoist
Ø
2012 Maoist rebels kidnapped two Italians in the eastern Indian
state of Odisha, the first time Westerners were abducted there.[31] 12 CRPF personnel were killed on March 27, 2012 in a landmine
blast triggered by suspected Naxalites in Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra
2002
The People's War Group (PWG)
intensified its attacks against politicians, police officers, and land and
business owners in response to a July ban imposed on the group by the Andhra
Pradesh government. The government responded by tightening security, allegedly
ordering attacks on suspected PWG members by state police and the "Green Tigers".
Police forces continued to have virtual impunity for the killing of PWG rebels
during police encounters. The Maoist Communist Center rebels intensified their
armed campaign against Indian security forces following the killing of their
leader by police in December. An estimated 140 people were killed in fighting
between the PWG and government forces throughout the year. According to
government reports, 482 people have died during the conflict that year.
2003
The
conflict in Andhra Pradesh intensified as Naxalite rebel groups, in particular
the PWG, continued guerrilla attacks on police and government targets while the
security forces stepped up counter-insurgency efforts. An October assassination
attempt on Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu was
consistent with the PWG’s practice of targeting government officials to draw
attention to their cause. According to independent media reports, as many as
500 people were killed in the conflict this year, half of these Maoist rebels.
2004
Sporadic,
low-intensity fighting between the PWG and government forces continued for most
of the year. Attacks on police and TDP party officials, believed to be carried
out by the PWG, accounted for most major incidents and deaths. A three-month
cease-fire, announced in late June, led to failed negotiations between the
government and the PWG. A few days into the cease-fire, an attack attributed to
the PWG placed the cease-fire in jeopardy. More than 500 people were killed in
sporadic, low-intensity fighting, a reduction from previous years. Most victims
were members of the police forces or the Telugu Desam Party (a regional
political party).
2005
Violent
clashes between Maoist rebels and state security forces and paramilitary groups
increased following the breakdown of peace talks between the PWG and the state
government of Andhra Pradesh. Rebels continued to employ a wide range of
low-intensity guerrilla tactics against government institutions, officials,
security forces and paramilitary groups. For the first time in recent years,
Maoist rebels launched two large scale attacks against urban government
targets. Fighting was reported in 12 states covering most of south, central and
north India with the exception of India’s northeast and northwest. More than
700 people were reported killed this year in violent clashes. Over one-third of
those killed were civilians.
2006
Maoist
attacks continued, primarily on government and police targets. Civilians were
also affected in landmine attacks affecting railway cars and truck convoys.
Clashes between state police and rebels also resulted in deaths of members of
both parties, and civilians that were caught in the crossfire. Fighting differs
from state to state, depending on security and police force responses. In the
state of Andhra Pradesh, security forces have been somewhat successful in
maintaining control and combating Maoist rebels. The other state that is most
affected, Chhattisgarh, has seen an increase in violence between Maoist rebels
and villagers who are supported by the government. In 2006, 500 to 750 people
were estimated killed, fewer than half Naxalites, and approximately one-third
civilians.
2007
Fighting
continued between Naxalite Maoists and government security forces throughout
the year. The majority of hostilities took place in Chhattisgarh, which turned
especially deadly when over 400 Naxalites attacked a Chhattisgarh police station, seizing arms and killing dozens.
In
November 2007 reports emerged that anti-SEZ (Special Economic Zone) movements such as the Bhoomi Uchched
Pratirodh Committee in Nandigram in West Bengal, which arose after the land
appropriation and human displacement following the SEZ Act of 2005, have joined
forces with the Naxalites since February to keep the police out. Recently,
police found weapons belonging to Maoistsnear Nandigram. Civilians
were forced to choose between joining the Maoist insurgence or supporting the
Salwa Judum and face coercion from both sides. According to news reports, this
conflict resulted in 650 deaths during 2007; of these 240 were civilians, 218
security personnel and 192 militants.
2008
Civilians
were most affected in the ongoing fighting between Maoist rebels and government
security forces. Of the 16 states touched by this conflict, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand were the most affected. One positive note for
Chhattisgarh was that fatalities, although still high, were significantly down
from 2007. Similarly, Andhra Pradesh, the state with the most Maoist activity a
few years ago, has improved security with a corresponding drop in fatality
rates. Unfortunately, as conditions have improved in Chhattisgarh and Andhra
Pradesh, the Maoist forces seem to have shifted their operations to the state
of Orissa where conditions have worsened. South Asia Terrorism Portal’s
fatality count across the six states that saw the majority of the fighting
(Bihar, Orissa, Jharkhand, Maharashira, Chhattisgarh, and Andhra Pradesh) was
794. This included 399 civilians, 221 security force personnel and 174
insurgents.
2009
In
2009, Naxalites were active across approximately 180 districts in ten states of
India.
In
September 2009 India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh admitted that the Maoists had growing appeal
among a large section of Indian society, including tribal communities, the
rural poor as well as sections of the intelligentsia and the youth. He added
that "Dealing with left-wing extremism requires a nuanced strategy – a
holistic approach. It cannot be treated simply as a law and order
problem." In the first half of 2009, 56 Maoist attacks were reported. The South Asia Terrorism Portal
reported 998 killed in the conflict: 392 civilians, 312 security forces and 294
rebels.
2010
During
February the Silda camp
attack killed 24
paramilitary personnel of the Eastern Frontier Rifles in an operation the
guerillas stated was the beginning of "Operation Peace Hunt", the
Maoist answer to the government "Operation Green Hunt" that was recently launched
against them. According to Crisis
Watch and various news sources, between 500 and 600 people were killed this
year. Of those killed, approximately 366 were civilians, 188 were government
troops (including police) and 27 were Naxalites. According to South Asia
Terrorism Portal and government sources, over 1,000 deaths occurred in the
conflict this year. This includes 277 security forces, 277 Naxalites, and more
than 600 civilian.
On 6
April, Naxalite rebels killed 76, consisting
of 74 paramilitary personnel of the CRPF and two policemen. Fifty others were wounded in
the series of attacks on security convoys in Dantewada district in the
central Indian state of Chhattisgarh.[59] The attack resulted in the biggest loss of life
security forces have suffered since launching a large-scale offensive against
the rebels. On 17 May, a Naxalite
landmine destroyed a bus in Dantewada district
, killing up to 44 people including
several Special Police Officers (SPOs) and civilians.
On 28
May
the derailment of a Kolkata–Mumbai night train killed at least
150 persons. Maoists were responsible for the sabotage which caused the disaster.
On 29
June, at least 26 policemen are killed in a Maoist attack in the
central Indian state of Chhattisgarh.
On 29
August, a joint team of BSF and district police was attacked by the
rebels in Bhuski village (Chhattisgarh) under Durg Kondal police station in the
district while they were conducting routine search operations in the wee hours.
Following the attack, the forces retaliated and in the action they lost five
security personnel, including three BSF jawans.
On 29
and 30 August, rebels ambushed a joint paramilitary-police team in Bihar, killing
10, wounding 10 more, taking 4 prisoners and robbing more than 35 automatic
rifles from the state forces.The Naxalites later freed 3 of the policemen after
Naxal leader Kishenji met with worried family members.
On 12
September, Naxalites killed 3 policemen and took 4 more hostage in an
ambush in Chhattisgarh. The 4 policemen were later released without conditions
after Naxal leaders listened to the appeals of family members. The freed
policemen also promised the Naxals to never take up arms against the insurgency
again.
On 5
October, rebels killed 4 Police officers as they were on their way to a
market in Maharashtra.
On 7
October, Naxalites attempted derailment of Triveni express, a train of
Singrauli-Bareilly route, by removing 4 fishplates and 42 sleeper clips.
On 8
October, Naxalites triggered a landmine in the border area between
Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra. The attack killed 3 Indo-Tibetan Border Police
(ITBP) jawans, wounded 2 more and destroyed a military jeep.
2011
During
May, Naxalites killed and dismembered ten policemen, including one senior officer in
the Gariyaband, Chhattisgarh area on the border with Orissa. In
June, the total fatalities of both the police and the paramilitary was 43.
On 21
July 2011, Maoist rebels in the central Indian state of Chhattisgarh blew
up a bridge, killing four people and wounding five others. The attack happened
when the Congress party chief of the state, Nandkumar Patel, was returning from
a party function.
Despite
the continued violence in 2011, the most recent central government campaign to
contain and reduce the militant Naxalite presence appears to be having some
success, the 2011 toll of 447
civilians and 142 security personnel killed having been nearly 50%
lower than the 2010 toll. Some states experiencing this sharp reduction in
Naxalite hostilities, such as Madhya Pradesh, attribute their success to their
use of IAP funds for rural development.
2012
In
mid-March, Maoist rebels kidnapped two Italians in Orissa. They later
released one, while the government of Orissa negotiated for the release of the
second. The Maoists released the second hostage in the middle of April. The Member of the Legislative Assembly(MLA) of
Laxmipur constituency (Orissa), Jhin Hikka, was abducted by the Maoists in
March, who demand the release of 30 Maoist cadres (presently in jail) in
exchange for the freedom of the MLA. The Orissa Govternment is negotiating with
the cadres with the help of arbitrators to free the MLA.
On
27 March, an explosion blamed on Maoists killed 15 Indian policemen in Maharashtra.
2013
The 2013 Naxal attack in Darbha valley resulted in the deaths of around 24 Indian National Congress leaders including the former state minister Mahendra
Karma and the
Chhattisgarh Congress chief Nand Kumar
Patel.
The roots of
the problem lie in the alienation of the tribal’s. Extreme sensitivity is
required to tackle the issues involved. Rough and ready methods of using force
may prove counterproductive in the long run, says Colonel (retired) Anil
Athale.
The
ambush by Naxalites in Bastar area of Chhattisgarh on a convoy of Congress
party men returning from a rally on Saturday has sent shock waves in that party
and central government led by it. But the latest clarification by the Naxalites
makes the issue clear. This was a revenge attack against two individual
Congress leaders, Salwa Judum founder Mahendra Karma and state Congress chief
Nand Kumar Patel, for their role in the anti-Naxal vigilante group and
‘Operation Green Hunt’ respectively.
This has
clarified the issue somewhat as most of us were a little surprised as to why Naxals
would target a party that has been pushing for a ‘soft line’ on Naxals. It is
likely that the rebels feared that the party may come to power under these two
and make life difficult for them. The elimination of these two leaders has left
the field open for Ajit Jogi, known to favour a soft approach to Naxals. While
there was much VIP tear shedding for Patel, Karma, died unsung. My tributes to
Karma who was abandoned by his own party and even in death remained a victim of
‘left wing’ sway over his party.
But the
casualness of the security provided to the victims and ‘apparent’ confidence of
the Congressmen that they had nothing to fear, is both strange and callous.
Even a total non VIP like this author was provided at least 10 soldiers for
personal protection while moving in Manipur! This was in spite of the fact that
whole route was manned by soldiers at 200 yards interval! When this author
queried about this, he was told that this is ‘routine’ and Standard Operating
Procedure for any movement.
In another
instance, this time in Kashmir valley, one vividly recalls how a junior officer
chided senior colonels of the army for violating convoy discipline! As per the
army SOP all persons in a convoy have to obey the convoy commander,
irrespective of their rank!
Time and
again, the Indian police and para-military forces have failed to display
professionalism and paid the price.
The
Naxalite phenomenon is unique in many ways. Here is a movement of tribals led
mostly by non-tribals from Telangana. Imagine Naga insurgents being led by
Assamese or Kashmiri separatists led by Biharis? The truth is the Naxal
revolutionaries, are not there to solve the problems of Adivasis. They are
there as the forests offer sanctuaries for training and rest. The general
neglect of the area, callous forest guards/police and power vacuum, made the
task of the Naxals easy.
Once
having helped the adivasis through their ‘Robin Hood’ methods, they now intend
to milk the adivasi support for the ‘higher purpose’ of ushering the Marxist
revolution throughout India.
The
saddest part is that far too many arm chair ‘welfarists’ have been taken in by
the pro-tribal rhetoric of Naxalites and never challenged the Naxal ideology.
The Salwa
Judum or armed mobilisation of tribals by Karma to target the sangham (over ground sympathisers) members,
hit at the weak point of the Naxals. Their meagre armed strength is useless
without the sangham members and passivejanata.
The fact that all the top leaders of Naxals are non-tribals was a major factor
in this breach between the two.
Mao had
once famously said that the guerilla and popular support is like fish and
water. Without the support of the masses the insurgent/guerilla cannot survive.
Alarmed
at the erosion of popular support and fear of being isolated, the over ground
wing of the Naxalites in cities and the capital New Delhi launched a fierce
campaign against Salwa Judum. The media with its inherent leftist bias went to
town over alleged atrocities by Salwa Judum members. The courts, human rights
commission and civic activists were utilised to defame the resistance. It was
dubbed as state government’s attempt to get tribal killed by tribal.
Everyone
conveniently forgot that village defence forces being organised to fight rebels
has a long history within India and outside. The central government with
woolly-headed thinking and to get Naxal help in national elections ultimately
succeeded in winding up the potent movement.
Emboldened
by the ‘victory’ over Salwa Judum, the Naxals went about consolidating their
hold over the forest areas and by 2010, were bold enough to take on the
para-military forces in open confrontation. The May 27 incident is a logical
culmination of the winding up of Salwa Judum and Operation Green Hunt.
Do the
Naxals seriously believe that ‘revolutionary conditions’ as described by their
guru, Che Guevara, really exist in India for their revolution to succeed? All
this leads one to the conclusion that essentially the Naxals are a gang of
thugs and robbers much on the lines of Sandalwood smuggler Veerappan, who also
put up a charade of ‘Tamil pride’ to hide his criminal activities.
The roots
of the problem lies in the alienation of the tribals on two counts -- one due
to the unfair forest legislation, their natural habitat and second due to the
glaring gap between the lifestyle and living standards of the tribals and
plains men. Extreme sensitivity is required to tackle the issues involved.
Rough and ready methods of using force may prove counterproductive in the long
run.
Thus
there is a dilemma of sorts, while urgency demands action sensitivity to tribal
identity merits caution and preparation. What is needed is a completely new
model of administration to be evolved based on sensitivity, realism and
continuity. A re-look at erstwhile Indian Frontier Administrative Service like
organisation may be worthwhile in light of our experience of repeated
administrative failure in these areas.
Rule of
law must replace the rule by the outlaw. Here the quality of administrator and
law enforcer would matter a great deal. Tribals are war-like people and proud
of being so. The history of Gonds and Santhals in resisting all manner of
invaders should never be forgotten, nor their stand in support of the late Pravir Chandra Bhanjadeo (external link). In bringing the tribals to modernity care must
be taken to be gradual and transition should not be from no clothes to a
three-piece suit.
The three
step approach to ideological conflicts is to contain-neutralise and reform. In
this important aspect of the battle, media and communication (both verbal and
non verbal) plays a major role The common perception of murgi chor (chicken stealing) soldiers or
policemen do greater damage to the legitimacy of counter-insurgency than any
amount of adverse propaganda.
In the
heat of the battle there is a temptation to target the sympathisers for acts of
violence by the armed insurgents. There is a major debate as to what
agency/organisation must be used and for what task. There is a marked
reluctance on the part of the armed forces to get involved in a domestic
quarrel where there is no clear external element.
The
para-military forces are expected to carry the major burden of fighting such
wars. But there is a major problem here. At the level of section or platoon,
where the guerrilla war is fought, these operations are in no way different
than similar operations in conventional wars. The para-military forces are
neither trained nor equipped to fight a war and are often found wanting. The
principle of adequate force means that the armed forces cannot use their full
range of equipment, a sort of fighting with one hand tied behind back. A way
out of this dilemma is a middle path where in the armed forces act in support
of the para-military.
For
instance the searches and neutralisation may be carried out by the police, the
armed forces lay the outer cordon to prevent escapes.
The South
Africans faced a similar problem when they faced the African National Congress-led
sabotage and subversion operations inside the country while a full-blown
guerrilla war raged in South West Africa and Angola.
This
worked since the ANC was unable to launch guerrilla war inside South Africa
proper. But the South Africans created special police units to do this task,
which were organised and trained on the lines of special forces of the army.
South Africa also consciously took a decision to not occupy territory and
instead organised mobile, high-tech company groups to hit at the rebel bases
and keep them unbalanced. This was a lesson learnt from the Vietnam War where
the Americans entered the swamps and fought the guerrillas on their own terms.
It is
very difficult to make any definitive judgement on this issue but suffice it to
say that counter insurgency must be fought as a multi-agency operation and with
a suitable mix of military, police, intelligence and high tech special forces.
Are we
ready to accept as nation that one cannot make an omelette without breaking
eggs?
(Detailed
study can be found in Quest for Peace,
Studies in Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies, Vij Books, New Delhi, 2011)
Colonel Anil
Athale, former Chatrapati Shivaji fellow of the United Services Institution and
a student of insurgency for the last 35 years. He has researched Kashmir, the
north-east, Sri Lanka, Naxal, South African and Northern Ireland insurgencies
during this period.
There
are few questions that raise the heads are:
How
it’s never been a concern for the governments when there are full camps to
train the youth by Naxalite groups?
Can any one fight a battle with out proper
training and weapons? Of course not!! Then from where these Naxalite groups get
funds for such high-tech weapons?
And
if we look at the Guerilla warfare system of maoist then we find it very developed
while we send our army to tackle each and every thing to settle down. Do not
you think that there should be a special forces to fight with Naxalite groups
in forest who are trained in Gurellia warfare?
Is
it possible with out any political party’s support that they carry on with such
dangerous weapon and training with in the terroary of India and no one is there
to have a proper check what’s going on? Then who is supporting them? Who is
funding them? Why we are not able to implement any strategy against Naxalite groups
since 1969-2013?
